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Abstract: The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has left a strong imprint on many aspects of urban life. 
Gated communities (GCs) in China are less commonly perceived as a negative and segregated urban 
form of community compared to other contexts, owing to their wide variety and relative openness. 
Yet, the enhanced security zone function and the popularity of GCs, along with the heightened 
segregation and exclusion effects, mean they are most likely to emerge in post-pandemic urban 
China because of the perceived effectiveness of GCs in preventing health risks by excluding 
outsiders during the pandemic. Drawing on empirical data from Beijing, this research presents 
strong evidence for a strengthened perceived ‘security zone’ effect of GCs during the pandemic. 
Given that rigid pandemic control measures were organized at the community level, a large-scale 
household survey in Beijing suggests that residents commonly recognise the effectiveness of GCs 
in security control and show a strong preference for GCs over open communities after the 
pandemic, even though there is a lack of direct evidence of reduced COVID-19 risk in GCs. The 
heightened perceived ‘security zone’ function of GCs has shown a significant impact on the housing 
market, evidenced by an increase of 2% in the housing prices for GCs, compared with those of open 
communities. The rising popularity of GCs is also evidenced by a significant increase in property 
viewings by potential homebuyers and smaller price discounts in actual transactions in gated 
communities vis-à-vis open communities. We argue that the rising risk-averse sentiment in the post-
pandemic era has given rise to the popularity of GCs. This study provides timely and fresh insights 
into the changing meaning of GCs in post-pandemic China. 
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1. Introduction 
The global prevalence of gated communities (GCs), to which public access is 
restricted, has attracted scholarly attention for decades [1]. GCs not only emerged as an 
innovative form of living catering to residents’ various demands (e.g., security, high-
quality housing, all-inclusive lifestyle and conspicuous consumption) but also 
revolutionized neighborhood governance [2–5]. Despite the growing popularity, GCs 
have been harshly criticized by urban theorists for producing negative social effects, for 
example, exacerbating segregation and exclusion through erecting walls and gates, and 
their encroachment into public space [1,6,7]. 
In China, the proliferation of GCs is associated with unique cultural and institutional 
forces and, thus, entails different interpretations. Since the late 1990s, most housing estates 
in China have taken a gated form, resembling the walls, gates, guards, and to some extent, 
the self-governance of GCs in the West. However, Chinese GCs are distinct in their 
pervasiveness and wide varieties, as well as the public’s relatively neutral attitude and 
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tolerance. Although GCs of large sizes are usually blamed for dampening the connectivity 
within the city and contributing to traffic congestion [8], they are rarely criticized for 
exacerbating social segregation and exclusion in China. This is often considered as the result 
of a long tradition of urban enclosures and the dominant role of the state [9–11]. Gating in 
new housing developments is implicitly endorsed by the Chinese state and promoted as a 
national standard to enhance the provision of local public goods after the housing 
commodification [12]. Among the three main types of GCs identified by Blakely [1], (i.e., 
lifestyle, prestige, and security zone communities), security zone is perhaps the least 
emphasized function in the Chinese context for two reasons. First, different branches and 
organizations of local governments still take up the main responsibility of safeguarding 
public security, among which the residents’ committee serves as a grassroots government 
organ at residential community level, rather than heavily relying on the GCs as reported in 
certain countries [13]. Different from other contexts, the security zone function of GCs in 
China is deemed mainly as psychological rather than practical [14–18]. Second, many GCs 
in Chinese cities do not enforce stringent access control as they are supposed to be, especially 
for the more affordable GCs and those converted from danwei (work unit) compounds, 
which render these GCs more akin to open communities despite their physical walls and 
gates. This also partially explains why GCs in China are less commonly discussed in the 
lexicon of segregation and exclusion as in international debates. 
During the COVID-19 outbreak, China and many other countries imposed lockdown 
orders that required or encouraged households to stay at home to prevent virus 
transmission. What was unique to China was the stringent access control imposed on nearly 
all residential communities, either through a top-down order by the local government or 
bottom-up initiatives voluntarily organized by local residents [19,20]. Thus, the security 
zone function of GCs had been heightened. Evidently, given the existing security facilities 
and measures, e.g., gates, walls, and CCTV cameras, even though they were not fully 
utilized in the pre-pandemic era, implementing stringent access control in GCs was easier 
than in open communities. Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, citizens’ perception of GCs 
may have substantially changed because of the rising risk-averse sentiment, with significant 
implications for the housing market and urban socio-spatial patterns. However, these 
important issues have not been empirically examined and comprehensively understood. 
Therefore, drawing on the empirical data from Beijing, China, we aim to present a timely 
and updated understanding of the heightened security zone function of GCs during the 
pandemic and its implications for the housing market. This research is centralized on two 
interrelated questions: (1) How has Chinese citizens’ perception of GCs concerning the 
security zone function changed due to the pandemic? (2) How does that affect the housing 
market dynamic? Drawing on our empirical findings in Beijing, we would also like to 
discuss the possible long-term implications for residential segregation and exclusion 
concerning the development of GCs. 
The two research questions are addressed using online survey data and housing 
transaction data from Beijing. We conducted an online questionnaire survey among 975 
Beijing residents and collected a dataset of 76,465 housing transactions during the COVID-
19 outbreaks from 935 residential communities in Beijing. Changes in residents’ 
perception of GCs’ security zone function and the preference for GCs due to the COVID-
19 outbreak are identified based on self-reported data from the online survey and an 
analysis of housing transaction data using a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) 
model. It is established in the literature that people’s perception can have a real impact on 
housing price [21,22]. In this study, the changing housing price dynamic related to key 
attributes of GCs is measured by the transaction price, the number of interested buyers 
and the discount from the listing price. 
This study renews our understanding of GCs in China by examining the changes in the 
function of gating and people’s perception towards it in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
and quantitatively measuring the impact on housing price dynamic. Adding to the ongoing 
debates on how cities are affected by the COVID-19 pandemic globally [23–25], this study 
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speculates on the possible implications for residential segregation and exclusion, which 
were perceived as less of a problem in China [9], associated with the development of GCs 
in Chinese cities. A growing sense of insecurity caused by the once-in-a-century health crisis 
might result in aggravated segregation in Chinese cities through excessive development of 
GCs with stringent access controls, which deserves further investigation. 
This study contributes to the extant literature in two ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to quantitatively examine the features of GCs and their 
impacts on the housing dynamics in China. Although the emergence and effects of GCs in 
China have been an important theme in urban research, their impacts on the housing 
dynamics have not been quantitatively understood on a par with other contexts. Second, a 
hybrid method of survey analysis and statistical regression models is applied to understand 
the possible mechanisms and outcomes of the changing housing dynamic affected by the 
preference for GCs. The remainder of the paper includes a literature review of GCs in China 
and the impact on housing market dynamics and an introduction of data and methodology, 
followed by the discussion of empirical results. The final section concludes. 
2. Gated Communities in China and the Impact on Housing Market Dynamics 
GCs in China have proliferated with an exceptional size and speed unseen in any 
other countries [12]. There are two major types of Chinese GCs—work unit (danwei) 
compounds and gated commodity housing estates. When China started the market-
oriented economic reform in the late 1980s, work unit compounds were either privatized 
or replaced by modern gated commodity estates with diverse housing choices, high 
population density, and, more importantly, the flexibility to be traded in the housing 
market [10,12]. Since then, modern gated commodity housing estates have become a 
prevalent form of residence in China. Although researchers often recourse to mainstream 
theories derived from the Western context to explain the proliferation of GCs in China, 
the distinct features of China’s GCs should be noted. 
Firstly, notwithstanding that the prevalence of GCs in China can be attributed in part 
to the security concern, the gates, walls, and fences in China’s GCs mainly provide residents 
a sense of security psychologically rather than functionally given that the crime rates in 
China are relatively low [14,15,26,27]. In neighborhoods where gates are considered 
insufficient to guarantee security, additional measures have to be installed [17]. For a large 
number of GCs, the provision of better services, as well as the sense of stability and 
homogeneity, are probably more important than simply the absence of crime [14,26]. In this 
sense, the security zone function of GCs is less applicable in China compared with other 
contexts that suffer from high crime rates, racial segregation, and wars [28–30]. 
Secondly, while the theory of club goods is a widely accepted explanation for the 
emergence of modern GCs in China, the indispensable role played by the state should not 
be overlooked [10,26]. The two major types of GCs in China were derived from different 
rationales—gating in danwei compounds was to ‘reinforce political control and collective 
consumption organized by the state’ under socialism [26], whereas gating in commodity 
housing estates owes more to the shift in housing and services provided to the more efficient 
club realm to cater to the surging demand from the middle-class and expatriates for a better 
quality residence [31,32]. Nonetheless, in both types of GCs, the state has played a 
fundamental role. Even in the post-reform era, the state rationalized the development of 
GCs by imposing national planning codes, as a way to relieve the local governments from 
the heavy burden of providing infrastructure and local public goods [3,10]. 
Thirdly, while GCs raise serious concerns for social segregation in many locales, they 
are perceived as less of an issue in China due to their unique political and cultural contexts 
[9]. Admittedly, gating in the post-reform era strengthens community development by 
enabling private governance through which residents gain better control over their 
community lives [33]. However, this does not reduce the top-down control and state 
intervention through dominating land development [34] and reinforcing the functions of 
the grassroots state apparatus (the residents’ committee) and the newly emerging 
Land 2021, 10, 983 4 of 23 
 
homeowners’ association [33,35]. The tight yet subtle control over GCs has helped reduce 
social segregation, as a close-knit network between GCs and other communities has been 
formed by the active involvement of grassroots state apparatus. Given the long history of 
urban enclosures with walls and fences, the cultural tradition of collectivism can account in 
part for the prevalence and tolerance of GCs in China [11]. Moreover, the wide varieties and 
large quantity of GCs in China also render a lower level of exclusiveness and segregation. 
The prevalence of GCs in China and their distinct features have been well 
documented in the existing literature [10,14,26]. Yet these key features and their impacts 
on the housing dynamics have not been quantitatively understood on a par with other 
contexts. Few studies examining the housing price dynamic of GCs reveal its significantly 
positive effect on housing values. For example, in their studies of GCs in different regions 
of the United States, LaCour-Little [36] documented a 9% price premium associated with 
GCs between 1980 and 1998, Bible [37] discovered a 6% price premium for the period 
1996–1998 and Pompe [38] reports a price premium of around 19% over the period 2002–
2005. A recent study in Ghana reveals a price premium of GCs ranging from 42% and 48% 
[39]. These wide variations in GCs’ price premium across countries and regions suggest 
the importance and necessity of a close examination of the qualities and functions of GCs 
to better understand their impacts on housing price dynamic, which is currently still 
lacking in the studies of China’s GCs. 
To fill this gap, this study aims to capture the changing function and perception of GCs 
during the COVID-19 pandemic and quantitatively examine their impact on the housing 
market. It contributes to the literature beyond simply providing new evidence to 
understand the overall price premium of GCs. While the existing literature generally relies 
on dichotomous price comparison between gated and open communities, it is difficult to 
differentiate the price premium generated by various functions/attributes of GCs, e.g., 
enhanced security versus other amenities or being a symbol of social status. In this study, 
we make one of the first attempts to track the pulse of the volatile housing market through 
monitoring how housing prices of GCs have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic, which 
has constituted an unexpected exogenous force projecting profound impacts on GCs and 
housing development more generally in China. In particular, we focus on the price premium 
generated by the security zone function of GCs, which may have been significantly 
heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic because of the risk-averse sentiment. During the 
pandemic, other conditions in existing GCs such as amenities and symbolic values remained 
largely unchanged; the major changes widely recognized in news reports and social media 
in Chinese cities have been in the enhanced security measures through stringent access 
control. If living in GCs brings greater utility for residents in terms of providing extra 
protection against virus spread by excluding ‘suspicious’ outsiders during the pandemic, 
and if the housing market swiftly responds to citizens’ growing need for enhanced security, 
we should be able to observe positive housing price changes within GCs and to 
quantitatively measure the price premium brought by the security zone effect of GCs. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. The Case Study of Beijing 
Beijing is the capital city of China and one of the largest and most developed cities in 
the country. According to the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, over 21 million 
residents were living in its administrative area of over 16 thousand square kilometers in 
2020. The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the Beijing municipality in 2020 
amounted to around CNY 164,900, equivalent to about USD 25,500. 
We chose Beijing as the study case because this city has experienced the strictest 
epidemic controls in China (except for the ground zero of Hubei province) and is one of 
the few Chinese cities that has experienced two waves of the COVID-19 outbreak (see 
Figure A1). In particular, the Chinese government implemented distinctive strategies in 
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these two outbreaks, and it was only in the second outbreak that epidemic controls were 
mainly organized at the community level [20]. 
The first outbreak started with the lockdown of Wuhan on 23 January 2020 and ended 
when the last local infected patient was cured on 8 June in Beijing. The government’s 
major epidemic prevention strategy in the first outbreak was to restrict inbound travels to 
Beijing and suspend economic activities. Schools and public facilities, such as libraries, 
did not open until early June. The Beijing government also announced a notice of further 
strengthening community (village) pandemic prevention and control to require strict 
access control in residential communities. Those without necessary management facilities 
were assisted by local officials to impose access controls. Therefore, in the first outbreak 
period, many local residents significantly reduced their travels within the city and spent 
most of the time at home. Figure A2 shows that the intensity of internal travel in Beijing 
did not return to the normal level until early May. 
The second outbreak happened on 11 June when new infection cases originated from 
a large local food market (Xinfadi) supplying 80% of Beijing’s vegetables and meat [40]. 
Up to the point when Beijing reported no more new cases again for the first time on 7 July, 
335 people were infected in this wave. Different from the first outbreak, the government 
deployed more targeted epidemic controls at the community level in the second wave. 
As the government gradually strengthens regular epidemic preventions at the 
community level, residents’ daily activities have been less restricted. However, they have 
become more cautious about the security of their residential estates. While many estates 
have regularly checked the residents entering the communities [41], conducting such 
epidemic controls in those large and open residential communities was reported to be 
difficult [42]. These two waves of the COVID-19 outbreak in Beijing present a unique 
opportunity to empirically test how the security zone function of GCs has changed and 
its influence on the housing market under different pandemic control measures. 
3.2. Data Collection 
3.1.1. Online Household Survey 
To understand the changing perception of the security zone function of GCs in 
Beijing during the pandemic, we carried out an online survey in March 2021. The survey 
was implemented with a professional survey company NetEase, which is also one of the 
largest internet technology companies in China with over 0.8 billion subscribed users. The 
online survey invitations were sent to NetEase subscribers using the quota sampling 
method. To ensure the survey sample represented the general population in the surveyed 
city, we set a fixed quota for respondents with different housing tenures, and from 
different age cohorts and districts proportional to the overall population in Beijing. A total 
of 975 valid questionnaires were collected from residents, with a response rate of 21.4%, 
which is on par with or even higher than the average response rate for an online survey 
[43]. The survey was used to collect self-reported information regarding residents’ 
experience with and perception of GCs during the COVID-19 pandemic by asking 
retrospective questions and to understand their motivations for moving into GCs 
afterward (see Table A1). 
The demographic and socioeconomic profiles of respondents are provided in Table 
1, in comparison with the most recent population survey in Beijing. In general, 
respondents were diverse in terms of their gender, age, education, income level, and 
location of residence, yet they were less representative of less educated residents (i.e., 
below high school), female residents, and older residents (i.e., above 60 years old). This 
suggests that NetEase subscribers tend to be skewed toward the well-educated and 
younger male population, which is understandable given the widely recognized digital 
divide. On the positive side, it may better match with our housing data sample, which 
was mainly drawn from commodity housing in Beijing. Notwithstanding this limitation, 
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we believe that the survey results can offer an important understanding of the general 
public’s changing perception of GCs given the quota sampling strategy. 
Table 1. Summary of Survey Respondents by the Type of Communities. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
All Respondents 
N = 975 
Respondents 
from GCs  
N = 643 
Respondents from 
Open Communities 
N = 333 
2015 Beijing 1% 
Population Survey  
N = 234,998 
Female 33.43% 34.06 32.23% 47.77% 
Age: 18–30 28.94% 25.51 36.45% 29.57% 
Age: 31–40 37.33% 37.01% 37.35% 22.39% 
Age: 41–60 25.35% 28.15% 20.18% 32.39% 
Age: >61 8.383% 9.33% 6.02% 15.65% 
Education: high school and below 8.483% 7.93% 8.73% 44.09% 
Education: college degree 71.36% 71.07% 71.99% 47.09% 
Education: postgraduate 20.16% 21.00% 19.28% 8.38% 
Income: <RMB 5000 7.685% 7.15% 7.53% / 
Income: RMB 5000–10,000 36.43% 36.70% 34.64% / 
Income: RMB 10,000–20,000 38.32% 38.41% 39.76% / 
Income: >RMB 20,000 3.994% 17.73% 18.07% / 
Local Beijing resident 55.00% 58.63% 48.19% / 
Rent 45.11% 41.06% 51.81% 37.41% 
Notes: The variables are categorical, and the number indicates the percentage of respondents/population in that category. 
Income level and local Beijing resident status are not available in the 2015 Beijing 1% population survey. 
Different types of residential communities were well-represented. There were 643 
survey respondents (65.9% of the sample) living in residential communities with gates 
and walls, and approximately 90% of them further reported that their communities have 
at least one type of additional access control, which include gatekeepers/security guards, 
automatic facial recognition, and smartcard or barcode scanning using smartphones. It is 
worth noting that there were important similarities between respondents from GCs and 
those living in open communities. As shown in columns (2) and (3) in Table 1 and Figure 
1, they show very similar distributions in terms of gender, education, income, and living 
district, which are important for their housing choices. Notably, GCs respondents were 
slightly older than those in open communities, and they were more likely to be local 
residents and homeowners, i.e., they tend to be relatively better off. Figure 1 shows that 
the spatial distribution of survey respondents largely resembles the distribution of the 
total population in Beijing in 2020. This suggests that the online survey can largely reflect 
Beijing residents’ general housing preference and their perception of GCs. 
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Figure 1. Spatial Distribution of Survey Respondents by the Type of Communities and Total Population. Notes: Total 
population data is drawn from the 2020 Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics. 
3.1.2. Housing Transaction Data 
We also collected housing transaction data from Lianjia.com (accessed on Day Month 
Year) to track the housing market dynamics during the pandemic. Lianjia is the largest 
real estate agency in Beijing that accounts for approximately 70% of the market share [44], 
which thus provides reliable information on the local housing market [45]. Our sample 
covers residential property transactions in Beijing that occurred between January 2019 and 
August 2020. Figure 2 presents the map of our study area and the sampled communities. 
After excluding transactions with incomplete information on housing price or physical 
property features, we obtained a total sample of 76,465 transactions from 935 residential 
communities. 
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Figure 2. Map of Study Area and Sampled Communities in Beijing. 
Referring to Sun [46], we identified GCs using the high-resolution aerial imagery and 
street views from the Chinese map services, including Baidu (map.baidu.com (accessed 
on Day Month Year)), Gaode (amap.com (accessed on Day Month Year)) and Tencent 
(map.qq.com (accessed on Day Month Year)). We measured gatedness by the use of gates 
for pedestrians and gates for cars. It is more likely for communities with both types of 
gates to impose access control of outsiders (see examples in Figure A2). Specifically, we 
defined three categories of gatedness in the order of strictness, denoted as Gated Degree: 
(1) at least one of visible pedestrian or car entrances from the street view is not gated; (2) 
all the visible pedestrian and car entrances are gated, but some entrances do not have 
street views, thereby inhibiting the identification of the gates; (3) all the pedestrian and 
car entrances are visible and are gated. Thus, a higher Gated Degree denotes a stricter 
level of access control. 
Summary statistics of the transaction data are presented in Table 2, with definitions 
of the variables reported in Table A2. The average transaction price was RMB 4.978 
million. On average, a typical apartment unit had a gross floor area of 81 m2, 2 bedrooms, 
1.1 living rooms and 1.2 toilets. Of the units, 63.7% were accessible by lift, and 24.2% were 
facing south. The percentage of the units that had subways stations within 1 km and bus 
stops within 500 m were 54.7% and 49.5%, respectively. The average number of hospitals, 
kindergartens, primary and high schools within 2 km were 7.6, 4.9, 4.4, and 4.1, 
respectively. The average floor area of the community was 109.5 thousand m2. Of the 
units, 25.9% were in a community with a green ratio of over 20%, and 19.4% of them had 
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a plot ratio larger than three. On average, 31.6 potential buyers visited the property before 
the property was sold at a discount of 3.4% from the initial listing price. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Housing Transactions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N Mean S.D. Min Median Max 
Price 76,465 4.978 2.478 0.020 4.365 43.005 
log (Price) 76,465 6.116 0.420 0.693 6.079 8.366 
Gated 75,312 0.363 0.481 0 0 1 
Gated Robust 75,312 0.627 0.484 0 1 1 
Gated Degree 75,312 1.890 0.791 1 2 3 
Estate Area 76,465 109.458 85.474 4.420 84.669 508.280 
log (Estate Area) 76,465 11.333 0.759 8.394 11.347 13.139 
Visited Applicants 75,540 31.594 41.029 0 18 927 
Discount from Listing Price 73,385 0.034 0.025 0 0.029 0.134 
High Green Ratio 76,465 0.259 0.438 0 0 1 
High Plot Ratio 76,465 0.194 0.396 0 0 1 
With Lift 76,465 0.637 0.481 0 1 1 
Post COVID 1 76,465 0.187 0.390 0 0 1 
Post COVID 2 76,465 0.062 0.242 0 0 1 
Gross Floor Area 76,465 81.057 34.093 15.530 72.500 652.700 
No. of Bedrooms 76,465 2.011 0.745 0 2 8 
No. of Living Rooms 76,465 1.089 0.426 0 1 4 
No. of Toilets 76,465 1.175 0.411 0 1 5 
Floor 76,465 4.023 1.077 1 4 6 
South Orientation 76,465 0.242 0.428 0 0 1 
Building Age 76,465 19.660 8.851 1 18 70 
Subway Within 1 km 76,465 0.547 0.498 0 1 1 
Bus Within 500 m 76,465 0.495 0.500 0 0 1 
Mall Within 1 km 76,465 0.527 0.499 0 1 1 
Park Within 1 km 76,465 0.653 0.476 0 1 1 
No. of Hospitals in 2 km 76,465 7.550 2.155 0 8 10 
No. of Kindergartens in 2 km 76,465 4.863 0.724 0 5 5 
No. of High Schools in 2 km 76,465 4.088 1.544 0 5 5 
No. of Primary Schools in 2 km 76,465 4.351 1.268 0 5 5 
Interior Decoration Quality 76,465 2.752 1.355 1 3 4 
Holding Period 76,465 1.549 0.770 1 1 3 
Number of Units in Estate 76,465 2944 2072 220 2319 13,077 
Total Floors in the Building 76,465 14.639 8.315 0 14 36 
Approximately 33.4% of the sampled communities feature a Gated Degree of one and 
40.6% of them a Gated Degree of two. The rest, 26.0%, of the sampled communities have 
a Gated Degree of three. The share of the sampled communities with a Gated Degree of 
one (i.e., communities with all entrances confirmed gated) is very close to the ratio of 
survey respondents from open communities (34.1%). Figure 3 plots the spatial distribution 
of the sampled communities by their Gated Degree, reflecting that open and gated 
communities are rather evenly distributed in different districts. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of the Sampled Community Area by the Gated Degree. 
3.3. Methods for Data Analysis 
For the online survey data, we mainly employed simple descriptive statistics and 
correlation analysis to unveil changes in people’s perception of GCs and motivations for 
moving into GCs. To process the housing transaction data, we used a standard hedonic 
price model based on a bundle of physical housing features to identify the housing price 
dynamics that are commonly applied in housing studies [47]. 
A multi-period DID strategy was implemented to capture the impact of the COVID-
19 pandemic on the housing price difference between gated and open communities. The 
aim is to provide complementary evidence for changes in people’s perception of GCs, 
which could reflect on the dynamics of the housing market [21,22]. 
The empirical model is specified as follows 
Yi,t = β1 Gatedi * Post1t + β2 Gatedi * Post2t + β3 Gatedi + λ’ Xi,t + ωi + φt + εit (1)
Yi,t is log (Pricei,t), the logarithmic form of the transaction price of unit i at time t. 
Gatedi is a dummy variable equal to one if unit i is in a gated community (the treatment 
group) and equal to zero (the control group) if otherwise. Post1t is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the transaction was made during the first outbreak period in Beijing (i.e., 23 
January 2020 to 10 June 2020) and zero if otherwise. Post2t is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the transaction was made during the second outbreak in Beijing (i.e., from 11 June 
2020, onwards) and zero if otherwise. Xit is a set of hedonic variables controlling for the 
physical property features, including area, bedrooms, living rooms, toilets, floors, 
orientation, building age and total floor number, distance to train station, bus stops, mall, 
park, hospital, kindergarten, primary school and high school, quality of interior 
decoration, holding period, and the number of housing units in the estate. ωi denotes the 
district fixed effects and φt denotes the year times month fixed effects. εit is the error term. 
In the baseline analysis, we defined the community with a Gated Degree of three as 
the treatment group (Gated = 1) and with a Gated Degree of one or two as the control 
group (Gated = 0). Alternatively, in the robustness test, we defined the estates with a 
Gated Degree of two or three as the treatment group (Gated Robust = 1) and the estates 
with a Gated Degree of one as the control group (Gated Robust = 0). Moreover, we directly 
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used the ordinal variable Gated Degree as the explanatory variable in an additional 
robustness test. 
The coefficients β1 and β2 estimate the changes in the price difference between gated 
and open communities due to the pandemic. The coefficient β3 represents the price 
difference between gated and open communities before the pandemic. In other words, it 
captures the ex-ante factors other than COVID-19 that drive the price difference between 
gated and open communities, which include the difference in the quality of amenities and 
social status of residents inside. Provided that the demand for these functions of GCs 
remain unchanged within a short period, β1 and β2 should represent the impact of the 
perception changes of GCs’ security zone function on housing prices during the two 
COVID-19 outbreaks. 
4. Changing Perception of GCs 
An increased popularity of GCs owing to the pandemic-induced safety concern is 
evidenced by the online survey results. First, it is shown that GCs are more likely to 
implement strict pandemic controls and the security function has been widely recognized 
by respondents in Beijing. According to the respondents, 80.0% of those living in GCs 
reported the existence of a special entrance permit with which only residents or people 
with special permission can access the community during the pandemic, while the figure 
was only 63.6% in open communities. Given the lack of official statistics to testify to the 
effectiveness of gating in containing virus’ spread, we rely on the perceived benefits 
reported by residents. Specifically, we asked respondents to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the main access control measures adopted in their GCs during the pandemic. Over 90% 
of the respondents believe that community access controls helped to contain the spread of 
coronavirus. Smartcard or barcode scanning using a smartphone, with which only 
residents or people with special permission can access the community during the 
pandemic, is perceived as the most effective measure, which is favored by 79.3% of the 
respondents. What followed is the use of automatic facial recognition (agreed by 70.4%) 
and gatekeepers/security guards (selected by 68.4%). 
Second, while GCs have been popular among Chinese residents in the past two 
decades owing to the pursuit of security, prestige, and lifestyle, the COVID-19 pandemic 
has further pushed up GCs patronage. Considering GCs’ effectiveness in excluding 
unwanted outsiders to contain the virus spread, 80.7% of existing GCs residents prefer 
GCs over open communities. Meanwhile, 70.2% of these GCs residents choose to stay in 
GCs to mitigate their fear of coronavirus. Possibly due to the negative experience during 
the pandemic, over 70% of respondents living in open communities prefer GCs, either for 
their effectiveness of pandemic control or for mitigating the fear of coronavirus. 
Moreover, a positive correlation between these two pandemic-related motives and the 
willingness to pay a price premium for living in GCs after the pandemic was discovered. 
Table 3 presents the results of the Pearson correlation tests. Among respondents living in 
open communities, the correlation between the willingness to pay a premium and the 
preference for GCs due to the effectiveness of pandemic control is 0.26 and among existing 
GCs residents, it is 0.2. The correlation between the willingness to pay a premium and the 
preference for GCs for mitigating the fear of the pandemic is 0.17 for open-community 
residents and 0.18 for GCs residents. That is to say, the pandemic-induced security 
concern may translate into a housing price premium. 
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Table 3. Pearson correlation tests. 
 (1) 
Respondents from GCs 
(2) 
Respondents from Open Communities 
 The willingness to pay a premium for GCs 
The preference for GCS due to:   
The effectiveness of epidemic control 0.20 *** 0.26 *** 
Mitigating the fear for the pandemic 0.18 *** 0.17 *** 
Notes: ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Hence, our survey results provide answers to our first research question by 
suggesting that the security zone function of GCs has been heightened and widely 
recognised and the security concern has become an important motive for residents 
choosing GCs over open communities after the pandemic. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy 
that GCs’ effectiveness in pandemic control is based on residents’ subjective evaluation, 
which has not been supported by the evidence of the actual infection rate in GCs versus 
open communities. The next section will examine how this changing perception of GCs’ 
security zone function affected the housing market dynamic during the two pandemic 
outbreaks in Beijing to provide answers to our second research question. 
5. Housing Market Dynamics Affected by the Changing Perception of GCs 
5.1. Housing Price Premium 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of Equation (1), using log (Pricei,t) as the 
dependent variable. In column (1), the treatment and control groups are classified by our 
main identification of GCs (i.e., Gated). Before the COVID-19 pandemic, units in the GCs 
were sold at a premium of 3.72% in comparison with units in open communities, 
controlling for other housing features. This result aligns with findings documented in the 
Western literature that the benefits associated with the GCs increase the property price. 
During the first outbreak period, no significant change was observed in this housing price 
premium of GCs over open communities. However, after the second outbreak, the prices 
of units in GCs become higher than those in open communities by an additional 1.99%, 
making a total price premium amounting to 5.71%. 
Table 4. Baseline Regression Results on Housing Prices. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Log (Price) 
Gated * Post COVID 1 −0.0031     
 (0.0037)   
Gated * Post COVID 2 0.0199 ***   
 (0.0059)   
Gated  0.0372 ***   
 (0.0018)   
Gated Robust * Post COVID 1  −0.0006  
  (0.0034)  
Gated Robust * Post COVID 2  0.0186 ***  
  (0.0057)  
Gated Robust  0.0667 ***  
  (0.0017)  
Gated Degree * Post COVID 1   0.0009 
   (0.0021) 
Gated Degree * Post COVID 2   0.0056 * 
   (0.0034) 
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Gated Degree   0.0307 *** 
   (0.0010) 
Constant 4.6444 *** 4.5932 *** 4.6357 *** 
 (0.0313) (0.0310) (0.0309) 
Physical Property Features Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Year * Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Observations 75,312 75,312 75,312 
R-squared 0.809 0.812 0.810 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Then, we tested the robustness of this finding by using alternative identifications of 
GCs (i.e., Gated Robust and Gated Degree), and the estimation results are reported in 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4. We found that after the second outbreak, the housing price 
of units in GCs increased by 1.86% more than units in open communities (Column (2)). If 
the degree of gatedness increases by 1, then the housing price after the second outbreak 
increases by 0.56% (Column (3)). However, we did not find a significant impact during 
the first outbreak, showing that our main finding remains intact. Lastly, a parallel pre-
trend is the key assumption in a DID model, and we verified this assumption by showing 
that no statistically significant change existed in the price premium of GCs before the 
COVID-19 outbreaks (details in Table A3). 
Thus, our findings imply that residents became more willing to pay a larger price 
premium for units in GCs due to the COVID-19 outbreak. This case is specifically true 
after the second outbreak because the community-centric pandemic controls were 
implemented only after the second outbreak [19], which led residents to care more about 
the community’s gatedness and security. We did not observe a significant impact during 
the first outbreak because most residents were more radically restricted in their own 
communities and the lockdown policies were generally uniform in the entire city. Thus, 
residents were less likely to be concerned about the gatedness of individual communities 
when the entire city was locked down. In this compulsory locked down period, they 
would have been concerned more about the housing quality inside the communities. This 
notion is supported as we found that in the first outbreak, factors inside the communities, 
such as a higher green ratio and a lower plot ratio, had a stronger impact on housing prices 
(detailed analysis provided in Table A4). On the contrary, as China’s President Xi has 
proclaimed that community-level pandemic controls should be ‘regularized’ for the 
coming years, the ‘security zone’ effect of GCs on housing prices in the second outbreak 
is, thus, expected to be prolonged in the years to come. 
One major limitation of the study is that, although we have demonstrated an 
increasing housing preference for GCs over open communities after the COVID-19 
pandemic using the DID model, and shown that the security concern is a driver for the 
demand using the survey data, it is possible that other features of gated communities may 
also account for the increasing post-pandemic demand for GCs. For instance, residents 
may prefer better amenities after the pandemic, which could concurrently spur the price 
of GCs together with the security concern. To eliminate this alternative explanation, we 
constructed an indirect measurement of the luxury estate as the proxy for the unobserved 
community amenities. Specifically, we defined the estates with the top 10% largest 
average unit size in Beijing as the luxury estate because the luxury estates usually offer 
larger units as well as better amenities. We found that the price premium of luxury estates 
did not change due to COVID-19 (details in Table A4), which implies that flight-to-
amenity is unlikely to be the cause of increasing housing demand for GGs. Nevertheless, 
we acknowledge that while we have investigated and disproved of the impact of green 
space, plot ratio, use of a lift, and luxury estates, we could not fully rule out the impact of 
all other unobserved amenities due to data limitation. 
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5.2. Number of Visited Applicants and Discount from Listing Prices 
The above results have suggested that the housing prices in GCs grew higher after 
the pandemic compared with those of open communities as residents were more 
concerned with security issues at the community level, and GCs, thus, have become more 
popular. To verify this finding, we conducted two additional tests. Specifically, we have 
shown that GCs became more popular than open communities after the pandemic as more 
potential buyers visited the listed units in GCs, and the corresponding discount in 
transaction prices compared with listed prices significantly decreased in GCs. 
If the price of units in GCs grew higher due to the popularity of GCs after the pandemic, 
it is hypothesized that more potential buyers would visit these units and the final 
transaction price would be closer to the initial listing price. To test this hypothesis, we first 
replaced the dependent variable in Equation (1) with the number of visited applicants. The 
estimation results are reported in the first three columns of Table 5. In columns (1) and (2), 
we use Gated and Gated Robust as independent variables, respectively. We found that units 
in GCs had two more visits than units in open communities on average due to the first 
outbreak and over four more visits due to the second outbreak. In column (3), we use Gated 
Degree as the independent variable, and a one-degree increase in the gated level leads to 
2.04 additional visits in the second outbreak. 
Table 5. Regression Results on Number of Visited Applicants and Listing Price Discounts. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Number of Visited Applicants Discounts from Listing Price 
Gated * Post COVID 1 2.2515 ***   −0.0016 ***   
 (0.8728)   (0.0004)   
Gated * Post COVID 2 4.2466 ***   −0.0025 ***   
 (1.5716)   (0.0006)   
Gated 1.1114 ***   0.0009 ***   
 (0.3785)   (0.0003)   
Gated Robust * Post COVID 1  2.0981 ***   −0.0016 ***  
  (0.7990)   (0.0004)  
Gated Robust * Post COVID 2  4.9158 ***   −0.0026 ***  
  (1.3902)   (0.0006)  
Gated Robust  0.6477 *   0.0012 ***  
  (0.3590)   (0.0002)  
Gated Degree * Post COVID 1   0.7439   −0.0006 ** 
   (0.4745)   (0.0002) 
Gated Degree * Post COVID 2   2.0415 **   −0.0010 *** 
   (0.8406)   (0.0004) 
Gated Degree   0.0470   0.0005 *** 
   (0.2054)   (0.0001) 
Constant 4.6444 *** 4.5932 *** 4.6357 *** 0.0457 *** 0.0453 *** 0.0458 *** 
 (0.0313) (0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Physical Property Features Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year * Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 74,404 74,404 74,404 72,299 72,299 72,299 
R-squared 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.102 0.102 0.102 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Similarly, we used the discount in the transaction price from the listing price as the 
dependent variable in Equation (1), with results reported in the last three columns of Table 
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5. We found that, during the first outbreak, the discount from the listing price for units in 
GCs was 0.16% lower than that for units in open communities. This reduction in discount 
became 0.25–0.26% in the second outbreak. A one-degree increase in gated degree resulted 
in a smaller discount from the listing price by 0.06% and 0.10% in the first and second 
outbreaks, respectively. 
Taken together, the empirical evidence suggests that housing units in GCs became 
more popular compared with open communities in Beijing after the pandemic, specifically 
after its second outbreak. 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
GCs in China present some distinct features, not only in terms of the scale, pervasiveness, 
and historical and cultural roots but also in the decisive role of the state and the perceptions 
of residents. Researchers need to investigate beyond the endogenous configuration of the built 
form and probe into residents’ urban experience under different exogenous forces to develop 
a dynamic and nuanced understanding of GCs in China and other contexts. 
This research perceives the COVID-19 pandemic as a unique opportunity to examine 
the changes in people’s perception of GCs in the face of an unexpected exogenous force 
and its influence on the housing market dynamic. Before the pandemic, Chinese GCs with 
varying degrees of affordability were mainly regarded as an efficient way of housing and 
related services provision, and segregation and exclusion were less of a concern of the 
public [9,26]. This research shows that an enhanced security zone function has been 
rediscovered in China’s GCs after the pandemic. The COVID-19 outbreak has heightened 
the sense of fear and insecurity in contemporary Chinese cities that feature high mobilities 
and uncertainties, which foregrounds the importance of safety in housing choices. GCs, 
thus, have gained increasing popularity for their perceived effectiveness in access control 
and their exclusion of ‘suspicious’ and ‘threatening’ outsiders. This notion is indirectly 
evidenced by a greater preference for GCs after the pandemic, as reflected in higher prices, 
more potential buyer visits, and smaller transaction price discounts from the initial listing 
price. On the generalizability of our findings, it should be noted that our analysis is 
essentially city- and time-specific, subject to possible data biases. Our study focuses on 
Beijing only, which is unique among Chinese cities due to its political and economic status. 
The empirical findings of GCs in Beijing during the pandemic do not necessarily apply to 
other Chinese cities, for which further studies are in need. 
This finding on the heightened security function of GCs is nontrivial for three reasons. 
First, from the perspective of pandemic control, our results indicate that it is essential to 
ensure adequate security measures of residential communities during severe public health 
emergences. Second, the enhanced security function of gating not only reflects residents’ 
demand but also sends out a strong and possibly misleading signal to real estate developers 
to increase the development of new GCs and the tightening of gating measures and access 
control. As a result, the COVID-19 pandemic may transform the relatively accessible and 
permeable features of GCs in China and make it a more negative and segregated urban form 
as documented in Western countries. Third, the elevated housing price of GCs will also 
worsen housing affordability and inequalities. Hence, certain social groups, specifically 
rural–urban migrants and low- to middle-income renters, are expected to be further 
excluded and marginalized, or even indirectly evicted from first-tier cities. This is 
particularly alarming for post-pandemic cities that will most likely suffer from a long-term 
economic downturn and a greater degree of inequalities. 
These potential consequences of the changing functions and perceptions of GCs urge 
us to rethink the meaning and socio-spatial implications of GCs in post-pandemic Chinese 
cities. As GCs becoming the dominant type of urban residence, it is important for 
policymakers and urban planners to rethink the balance between the importance of 
enhancing security during severe public health emergences and the need for accessible 
and permeable residential neighborhoods in post-pandemic cities. This study also sheds 
new light on our understanding of GCs’ impact on housing market dynamics by 
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foregrounding the importance of exogenous forces, for example, public health 
emergencies in this case, the significant yet complex and even paradoxical role played by 
state regulations, e.g., the community-level pandemic control measures, and the necessity 
for a dynamic examination of the evolving housing market dynamic and possible 
measures to mitigate housing inequality and segregation. 
Findings from this research can also inform spatial planning policies to achieve a 
more accessible, inclusive, and safe urban built environment in China. Previous advocacy 
and discussion on ungating the Chinese city have overlooked GC residents’ major 
concerns and perceptions, especially those concerning property values and community 
safety. Most of those advocacies were, thus, unmaterialized. Our research findings allude 
to some concrete and feasible measures, e.g., enhancing security measures and risk-
tracking and prevention measures at the neighborhood level, which can be introduced in 
future spatial planning policies to balance residents’ demands for a safe living 
environment and an overall urban planning goal of achieving a more accessible and 
inclusive city for all urban dwellers. 
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Figure A1. Daily Confirmed COVID-19 Cases in Beijing. Notes: The data is from Johns Hopkins 
Coronavirus Resource Center. 
 
Figure A2. The Intensity of Internal Travel in Beijing. Notes: The data is from Baidu Qianxi 
Mobility Dataset. The intensity of internal travel in an index measuring the total number of 
travelling residents in a city divided by the residential population. 
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Figure A3. Examples of Gated Communities and Open Communities. (a) Gated Communities: 
Xingjiyuan Estate; (b) Gated Communities: Yixiuyuan Estate; (c) Open Communities: Xingjiyuan 
Estate; (d) Open Communities: Yixiuyuan Estate. 
Appendix B 
Table A1. Key Survey Questions. 
Q1: Does your residential community have the following gated facilities? 
a. Gates and walls: Yes/No 
b. Gatekeepers/security guards: Yes/No 
c. Smartcard or barcode scanning using smartphone at the entrance: Yes/No 
d. Automatic facial recognition: Yes/No 
 




Q3: Do you think the following community access control measures are useful for preventing and 
controlling the pandemic? 
a. Gates and walls: Yes/No 
b. Gatekeepers/security guards: Yes/No 
c. Smartcard or barcode scanning using smartphone at the entrance: Yes/No 
d. Automatic facial recognition: Yes/No 
 
Q4: Do you agree the following argument: (using 5-point Likert scale) 
(1) “I prefer to live in a gated community because of its better pandemic prevention and control 
measures and capabilities” 
(2) “I prefer to live in a gated community to mitigate my fear for coronavirus” 
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Q5: Are you willing to pay more for living in a gated community than in an open community, 




Table A2. Definition of Variables. 
Variables Definition 
Price The transaction price of the property in the unit of million RMB. 
Gated 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if all the pedestrian entrances are visible from the map and 
are with access controls, zero otherwise. 
Gated Robust 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if all the visible pedestrian entrances from the map are with 
access controls, although some entrances do not have street views which inhibits the 
identification of the access control. Otherwise, it equals zero. 
Gated Degree 
A continuous variable equal to 3 if all the pedestrian entrances are visible from the map 
and are with access controls, and 2 if all the visible pedestrian entrances from the map are 
with access controls, although some entrances do not have street views. Otherwise, it 
equals one. 
Estate Area The estate’s total floor area in the unit of thousand squared meters. 
Visited Applicants 
Total number of visited applicants (i.e., potential buyers) between listing and final 
transaction. 
Discount from Listing Price 
The discount in the final transaction price from the listing price, calculated as 1–
(transaction price/listing price). 
High Green Ratio 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the green ratio of the estate is larger than 20%, zero 
otherwise. 
High Plot Ratio A dummy variable equal to 1 if the plot ratio of the estate is larger than 3, zero otherwise. 
Luxury Estate 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the average unit size in an estate is in the top 10% of the 
average unit size of all estates in Beijing, zero otherwise. 
With Lift A dummy variable equal to 1 if the building has a lift, zero otherwise. 
Post COVID 1 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the transaction is after 22 January 2020 (i.e., the lockdown 
of Wuhan) and before 11 June 2020 (i.e., the outbreak in the Xinfadi Seafood Market), zero 
otherwise. 
Post COVID 2 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the transaction is after 11 June 2020 (i.e., the outbreak in 
the Xinfadi Seafood Market), zero otherwise. 
Gross Floor Area Total gross floor area of the unit. 
No. of Bedrooms Number of bedrooms in the unit. 
No. of Living Rooms Number of living rooms in the unit. 
No. of Toilets Number of toilets in the unit. 
Floor 
A categorical variable indicating the range of the unit floor: 0 = Underground Level; 1 = 
First Level; 2 = Low Level; 3 = Mid-Level; 4 = High Level; 5 = Top Level 
South Orientation A dummy variable equal to 1 if the unit is facing south, zero otherwise. 
Building Age 
Age of the building, calculated as the transaction year minus the building completion 
year. 
Subway Within 1 km 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if there is at least one subway station within 1 km from the 
unit, zero otherwise. 
Bus Within 500 m 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if there is at least one bus stop within 500 m from the unit, 
zero otherwise. 
Mall Within 1 km 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if there is at least one shopping mall within 1 km from the 
unit, zero otherwise. 
Park Within 1 km 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if there is at least one park within 1 km from the unit, zero 
otherwise. 
No. of Hospitals in 2 km The number of hospitals within 2 km from the unit. 
No. of Kindergartens in 2 km The number of kindergartens within 2 km from the unit. 
No. of High Schools in 2 km The number of high schools within 2 km from the unit. 
No. of Primary Schools in 2 km The number of primary schools within 2 km from the unit. 
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Interior Decoration Quality 
A categorical variable denoting the interior decoration quality: 0 = Others; 1 = No 
decoration; 2 = Decorated; 3 = Well decorated. 
Holding Period 
A categorical variable denoting the holding period: 0 = Less than two years; 1 = Two to 
five years; 2 = More than five years. 
Number of Units in Estate Total number of units in the estate. 
Total Floors in the Building Total number of floors in the building. 
Table A3. Pre-Trend Test for the Multi-Period DID Model. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Log (Price) 
Gated * Pre-Trend Period 0.0039   
 (0.0044)   
Gated * Post COVID 1 −0.0025   
 (0.0038)   
Gated * Post COVID 2 0.0205 ***   
 (0.0060)   
Gated 0.0366 ***   
 (0.0020)   
Gated Robust * Pre-Trend Period  0.0046  
  (0.0038)  
Gated Robust * Post COVID 1  0.0001  
  (0.0035)  
Gated Robust * Post COVID 2  0.0193 ***  
  (0.0058)  
Gated Robust  0.0660 ***  
  (0.0018)  
Gated Degree * Pre-Trend Period   0.0020 
   (0.0023) 
Gated Degree * Post COVID 1   0.0012 
   (0.0021) 
Gated Degree * Post COVID 2   0.0060 * 
   (0.0034) 
Gated Degree   0.0304 *** 
   (0.0010) 
Constant 4.6443 *** 4.5931 *** 4.6357 *** 
 (0.0313) (0.0310) (0.0309) 
Physical Property Features Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Year * Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Observations 75,312 75,312 75,312 
R-squared 0.809 0.812 0.810 
Notes: Pre-Trend Period is a dummy variable denoting if the transaction is between November 22nd, 2019 and January 
21st, 2020 (i.e., two months before the lock down of Wuhan). Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table A4. Other Factors with Transient Effect. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log (Price) 
High Green Ratio * Post COVID 1 −0.0025    
 (0.0041)    
High Green Ratio * Post COVID 2 0.0088    
 (0.0067)    
High Green Ratio 0.0062 ***    
 (0.0021)    
High Plot Ratio * Post COVID 1  −0.0110 ***   
  (0.0043)   
High Plot Ratio * Post COVID 2  −0.0053   
  (0.0070)   
High Plot Ratio  −0.0250 ***   
  (0.0022)   
With Lift * Post COVID 1   −0.0105 ***  
   (0.0035)  
With Lift * Post COVID 2   0.0058  
   (0.0059)  
With Lift   0.0737 ***  
   (0.0026)  
Luxury Estate * Post COVID 1    0.0040 
    (0.0073) 
Luxury Estate * Post COVID 2    0.0010 
    (0.0107) 
Luxury Estate    0.0603 *** 
    (0.0037) 
Constant 4.6665 *** 4.6687 *** 4.6663 *** 4.6887 *** 
 (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0324) 
Physical Property Features Y Y Y Y 
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year * Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 76,465 76,465 76,465 76,465 
R-squared 0.807 0.808 0.807 0.809 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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